American medicine has been energized by two broad and critically important initiatives: evidencebased medicine and quality improvement. Inherent in both movements is the recognition that quality data are essential in improving the safety, efficacy, and cost of medical care. The proposal by Rid and Wendler [1] in this volume to create a formal process to assess the risks of common research interventions exemplifies these contemporary trends. As such, the proposal is welcome and should be subject to further discussion and development. The authors acknowledge the difficulties in collecting quality data on many common interventions, and their own preliminary work illustrates these difficulties. This commentary will not further emphasize that set of significant challenges, nor whether a formal repository is the best approach. A more fundamental question for the Rid and Wendler proposal is whether quality data on the incidence and nature of adverse events from research interventions will improve the conduct of research. The most important outcome of interest for this proposal is the demonstration that evidence will improve the experience of research participants and the quality of work by investigators and oversight bodies like institutional review boards (IRBs).
The focus by Rid and Wendler is research, but it should evident that their proposal potentially has high value for informed consent and risk reduction in clinical care. The traditional elements of informed consent in clinical medicine include information about the diagnosis or diagnostic questions, the reasonably available options, the risks and benefits of the options, and the clinician's proposed course of action. Much of the literature and law regarding informed consent has focused on the disclosure of risk. What constitutes ethically and legally appropriate standards for the disclosure of risks associated with different interventions or no interventions? Two broad standards are incorporated into state laws: the professional practice standard and the reasonable person standard. There is an implicit pre-sumption for both of these standards that clinicians have an accurate knowledge of the relevant risks. As Rid and Wendler demonstrate, this assumption is likely false with respect to many common interventions, primarily because the data have not been collected, or exist in scattered formats that limit firm conclusions. The author's assertion that disclosures are therefore based on intuition may be an overstatement, but individual or institutional experience is only a modest improvement. The point is that Rid and Wendler's proposal would improve our understanding of risks associated with common clinical interventions and lead to productive management of risk reduction and improved risk communication in clinical medicine.
Decision analysis suggests that people evaluate choices based on the probability of potential outcomes and the value placed on those outcomes. The approach advocated by Rid and Wendler is primarily focused on the probability component of this equation. A key question is whether changes in our understanding of the probabilities of adverse outcomes from certain research interventions will change or improve decisions made. From the investigator's and/or an IRB reviewer's perspectives, the question is whether additional data would alter the general 'intuitive' assessments that are commonly made about risk. In fact, intuitive estimates may prove to be accurate enough since we live our lives with poorly quantified risks. I believe that the risks of my morning drive to work are low and that the benefits outweigh the risks. It is unlikely that a detailed set of statistics on roadway morbidity and mortality for my route would change my conclusion. However, data might convince me to be more cautious when driving conditions are demonstrably more dangerous. Similarly, data on research procedural risks might be most useful when they reveal particularly vulnerable subpopulations of research participants.
For the IRB reviewer, risks often are categorical, that is, 'no more than minimal risk' or 'greater than minimal risk'. These determinations often are driven by a subjective assessment of the burdens associated with interventions rather than the probability of adverse outcomes. Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) might be considered more than minimal risk for a younger child or an individual with developmental delay because MRIs can be frightening and not because of safety considerations. Skin allergy testing might be considered more than minimal risk for some individuals because of the discomfort of the procedure, not because of the risk of systemic reaction. For these types of common interventions, a more accurate data set regarding quantifiable adverse effects may not influence IRB's subjective assessments about risk and burden. Would better information about research risks influence decisions made by potential research participants? The notion of informed consent is based on the expectation that people use information in rational ways to make decisions. The federal regulations require eight separate elements in the informed consent process, again with a certain expectation that this type of information is what people need and want. But it is important to emphasize that the federal regulations were not crafted on an evidence base. We understand that a large segment of the population is innumerate and unable to effectively use simple mathematical concepts like percentages or probabilities. We also appreciate that people often lack a frame of reference to decide whether a certain numerical frequency is high risk or low risk.
The value of evidence-based risk assessments
People might look to language in the consent form or social cues to decide whether an adverse outcome in 1 in 1000 procedures is acceptable.
But perhaps the most critical element in participant decision making is fostered by the fear and dependency commonly associated with illness. These factors create a vulnerability that makes many individuals heavily dependent on their trust in clinicians, clinical investigators, and their institutions for clinical decisions and research participation. Better risk assessments may be irrelevant to potential research participants if they primarily rely on their trust in others to interpret the risks and their acceptability. Clinical investigators and institutions may deserve trust to a greater degree by better assessments of the risks associated with research, but it is an open question whether better risk information will impact decisions by potential participants.
A robust system to collect and analyze information about common research risks would be welcome. But Rid, Wendler, and others need to close the evidence-based loop by demonstrating that such an effort has a beneficial impact on research participants, investigators, IRBs, and on the trust society places in the research enterprise.
